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Chapter I
Philosophy of recontextualization, 
recontextualization of philosophy. 
General remarks
1.
Let us begin our more detailed discussions with a rather general 
chapter that is an attempt to get close to Richard Rorty’s 
philosophical discourse on as broad a plane as possible and with 
a brief and introductory analysis of certain themes, questions and 
issues present in his recent books. Thus this will be a chapter not 
so much introducing to a wider context but rather introducing to 
Rorty’s thought itself. In the next chapters there will appear in the 
form of more detailed analyses, reconstructions, redescriptions 
and readings some questions incidentally and generally put here 
in this chapter. This pertains mainly, but not exclusively, to 
"philosophical excursuses" presented here. Let us give several 
examples to link the architecture of the book as a whole to the 
present chapter. The merely indicated, brief discussions of 
Jacques Derrida are developed in an enlarged and detailed textual 
analysis from the "excursus" on "seriousness, play, and fame"; 
remarks about self-creation and solidarity are developed in a 
separate chapter; reflections of Rorty’s use of literature and his 
pragmatic attitude towards it are developed in a chapter about the 
"priority of the wisdom of the novel to the wisdom of philosophy”; 
remarks about Rorty’s attitude towards the history of philosophy 
in general and to philosophy of Habermas, Foucault, Hegel, and 
Plato in particular are developed in separate passages. So, the 
chapter serves in the book the function of an implicit link between 
most of them, presenting not a general context of Rorty’s 
philosophy (its intellectual surrounding, its opponents and 
competitors) but rather its internal tensions and connections 
separated from other philosophers and from a broader plane of 
discussion presented in further parts of it.
■
The first volume of Rorty’s Philosophical Papers (1991) is 
devoted, for the most part, to the philosophers from the analytic 
circle, whereas the second to the figures and questions at the heart 
of which lie the works of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, 
Derrida and Foucault. It causes some noticeable tension between 
the two volumes but the links between them are created by 
"pragmatism" (and "liberalism"), strongly stressed and still clarified 
by Rorty. The first volume is shadowed mainly by one philosopher 
- Donald Davidson. Whereas when Rorty was writing his 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the first and extremely 
influential book, he was strongly influenced, as he admits himself, 
by Wilfrid Sellars and W.v. O. Quine, during the next decade (in 
the eighties) it was Donald Davidson that impressed him most and 
affected his philosophizing to the greatest extent. "I have been 
writing -  explains Rorty -  more and more about Davidson -  trying 
to clarify his views to myself, to defend them against actual and 
possible objections, and to extend them into areas which Davidson 
himself has not yet explored".1 Also in his Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity -  the book which seems to use the knowledge and 
experience of a multitude of texts from the collection of 
Philosophical Papers (and to which Rorty refers the reader as to 
its exemplification and a more detailed description), and perhaps 
a crystallization of these articles -  he sees Davidson as an 
absolutely crucial figure for his own considerations, especially 
those devoted to language, relations between language and 
reality, created truth rather than discovered one and so on. As is 
commonly known, Davidson is an antirepresentationalist and 
antiessentialist, he rejects the notion of language as some 
medium, as the third thing, intruding between the self and the 
reality. Knowledge, both to Rorty and to Davidson as well, is not 
a matter of getting reality right but rather a matter of "acquiring 
habits of action for copying with reality", as the former puts it. 
Rorty hopes that the realism-antirealism problem will become as 
obsolete as now is the realism-idealism problem, that the 
Anglo-Saxon philosophy will follow the lead of the most Germans 12
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1 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 1.
2 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 1.
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and Frenchmen curren tly  engaged in ph ilosophy and 
subsequently put the issue of representation aside, accepting the 
definition of truth favored by Rorty -  truth as "a mobile army of 
metaphors".3
It is just out of the above intuitions, hopes and expectations that 
to some degree the content of the second volume of Rorty’s 
articles arises. The author examines there those "Continental" 
thinkers who have broken with the problems of representation and 
started to search new areas in philosophy. Consequently, as can 
be seen from these brief remarks, he considers two traditions -  
the one running up to Davidson and the other running up to Derrida 
and marked by such figures as (the young) Hegel, Nietzsche, and 
Heidegger. Both these traditions, let us note, do not mention some 
quasi-thing called language which functions as intermediary 
between the subject and the object, the self and the reality: neither 
of them mentions the nature of representation, neither tries to 
reduce anything to anything else.4 As Rorty puts it: "Neither, in 
short, gets us into the particular binds into which the 
Cartesian-Kantian, subject-object, representationalisttradition got 
us".5 And that is exactly why they have been objects of Rorty’s 
unflagging interest.
The important point about Rorty, however, is that he warns us 
-  like all "ironists" do -  that we should not think of his writings as 
getting to the Truth, as trying to reach the nature of reality, the
3 The definition, let us add, coming from Nietzsche in "On Truth and Lies in 
Their Ultramoral Sense" which assumes there the following forrri: "What then is 
truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, 
a sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, canonic 
and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; 
worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses, coins 
which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but 
merely as metal". See commentaries in Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: 
Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1982) p. 217; Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s "Preface" to Derrida’s Of Grammatology (p. xxii), Rorty in CIS, p. 27 or 
Christopher Norris in Deconstruction: Theory & Practice (London: Methuen, 
1985), p. 85.
4 See Rorty’s chapter on “The Contingency of Language" in CIS, pp. 4-22.
Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 6.s
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"reality beyond appearances". That is, that they present one, finite 
and absolute argumentation and the only possible point of view - 
which would be in discordance with an ever-increasing and 
changeable "final vocabulary" of a self-creating individual and first 
of all inconsistent with the fundamental belief that nothing, as he 
says in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, mind, matter, our self 
or our world, possesses an inherent nature, some essence which 
could be represented or expressed. He makes it clear when he 
says that "my essays should be read as examples of what a group 
of contemporary Italian philosophers have called ’weak thought’ -  
philosophical reflection which does not attempt a radical criticism 
of contemporary culture, does not attempt to rebound it or 
reactivate it, but simply assembles reminders and suggests some 
interesting possibilities".6 Rorty does not search for the nature of 
reality, for the truth about it (since there is no such truth in his view) 
-  he is involved instead in recontextualization and redescription; 
one, short statement, to which we shall return more than once in 
this book, saying that "the most that an original figure can hope to 
do is to recontextualize his or her predecessors"7 could be thought 
of as the epigraph to his recent philosophical activities. And that 
is exactly what he is successfully doing in his texts.
It would be extremely interesting to ask several questions right 
here, but the answer to all of them will not be provided in this 
chapter, some of them will be given in further parts of the book. 
So, first of all, it would be exciting to ask the question about the 
comparison of the evolution seen in the texts from the eighties with 
the ir-in  a way-substratum contained in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity which seems to gather a vast majority of themes from 
the articles from both volumes of Philosophical Papers. Second, 
it seems worthwhile to consider the problem to which extent the 
texts collected there form a development of a certain fixed ideas 
(like that of a "scapegoat” in the case of René Girard, for instance) 
in different places and at various occasions. Third, what is 
intriguing is Rorty’s way of philosophizing; curving his own 
philosophical views in a fight with other views rather than their
40 Philosophy of recontextualization.
6 Ibidem, p. 6.
Ibidem, p. 2 -  emphasis mine.7
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production in isolation, that is, a polemical rather than 
presentational character of his works. It would also be interesting 
to trace his attitude towards "postmodernism" as a more and more 
worn-out concept, to ask about his capability of moving across 
various spheres of culture, about his style, cultural competence, 
his very philosophical manners; besides, it is interesting to know 
to which extent Rorty from both volumes of Philosophical Papers 
follows the recommendations directed later on to the figure of the 
"ironist",8 what is his account of liberalism today -  is it so strongly 
stressed here as it is in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity where 
the liberal utopia is the aim and the point of arrival? We would also 
like to ask to which extent Rorty is serious -  and to which he is 
"merely ironic" (in the way others are "merely aesthetic" or "merely 
literary", to use old distinctions), that is to say, what the "language 
game" he is involved in is, what sort of narrative he produces? It 
would be no less essential to try to solve the issue of Rorty’s 
identity -  whom would he like to be? a writer only, or still a 
philosopher? what sort of philosopher? Let us remember that 
Rorty is aiming at blurring differences between and rejecting 
pigeonholing of various realms of intellectual constructions;9 the 
issue concerning the genre that his books belong to would be an 
issue of the "metaphysician", as opposed to the "ironist", Rortyan 
cultural hero of the times to come. Finally, without any intention to 
exhaust a long list of ensuing questions, problems, and doubts, 
we would also like to put forward a question about the specifically 
Rortyan "pragmatism without method" which is sometimes 
referred to violently (especially among historians of American 
philosophy) as having little in common with pragmatism of its 
founding fathers. We shall try to touch here on some of the above
8 Rorty clarifies who the ironist is in a chapter on "Private Irony and Liberal 
Hope" from CIS, pp. 73-95.
9 He does this in the way the French "thought of the difference" and 
American deconstructionism try to blur the differences between the philosopher 
and the writer (though only in Barthes’ sense of the "author", écrivain, rather 
than the "writer", écrivant), philosophy and literature, science and art, a work and 
a commentary to it. See e.g. Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (Manchester 
University Press, 1984), pp. 80-81 or his "Philosophy and Painting in the Age of 
Their Experimentation" and "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde" (in: The Lyotard 
Reader, ed. A. Benjamin, Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. 181-195 i 196-212).
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questions, dealing with others in subsequent chapters of the book 
and leaving intentionally the multitude of them to careful readers 
of Rorty’s texts.
2 .
It seems that the traditional distinctions between philosophy 
and literature, criticism and art, and a commentary and a work is 
becoming more and more blurred in contemporary philosophy and 
literary theory.10 And what is at stake here is not a form of 
expression, but rather certain expectations and obligations 
traditionally ascribed to particular genres. Thus it has always been 
so that a novelist and literature in general "was allowed to do more" 
or "dared more", so to speak, than a philosopher and philosophy, 
an artist more than a critic, a work -  than a commentary to it. But 
what may be happening now is that philosophy and literature are 
steadily seized by some -  programmatic -  irresponsibility towards 
social matters, indifference towards their own community (to which 
Rorty refers as "marginalization"). His work read within such a 
context perhaps requires slightly different terms to be read. These 
could be, for example, terms like "books" or "writers", certain key 
word allowing to get closer to his philosophizing. While the 
opposition between a writer and a theoretician has found its full 
expression in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, where Rorty 
contrasts Proust with Heidegger, as well as philosophy in the 
traditional sense of the term with the work of such writers as 
Nabokov and Orwell, it had already been signalled in many texts 
from Philosophical Papers, announcing the future course his 
thought would take. So such figures as Baudelaire, Swift, Orwell 
and -  above all -  Rabelais, Dickens and Kundera appear here in 
numerous contexts. Especially Kundera, Rorty’s favorite, mainly 
as the author of Art of the Novel, the passage from which about 
thoughtless and dangerous, Rabelaisian agelasts -  those who
10 As Lyotard, to whom owing to our predilections we shall be often referring, 
says: "Aesthetics becomes a paraesthetics, and commentary a paralogy, just as 
the work is a parapoetics", "Philosophy and Painting in the Age of Their 
Experimentation" in: The Lyotard Reader, op. cit., p. 191.
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never laugh -  is, incidentally, the epigraph to Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity.11
Both in the book about "contingency" as well as in the collected 
essays from the eighties there appear the (Platonic, by all means) 
theme of putting the philosopher and the poet in front of each other, 
in two hostile camps. As we all remember, poets in Plato have 
been banned from polis and philosophers-kings have won their 
struggle for spiritual power. In the whole intellectual history of 
Europe since the times of Ancient Greece, it has been precisely 
philosophers and philosophy who have created these 
metanarratives viewed as so dangerous by postmodernists -  and 
not poets and poetry. Together with the "incredulity towards 
metanarratives" shared by Rorty and lying at the heart of the 
postmodern way of thinking -  for it is the way Rorty, following 
Lyotard, understands postmodernism, with all reservations to the 
term itself, its uses and abuses, as well as remembering about an 
additional distinction between narratives and edifying narratives 
from which only the former are shared by postmodernists, the latter 
being shared only by always hopeful Rorty* 12-  poetry and literature 
in general is specifically elevated. It was already the work of late 
Heidegger which seemed to defend poets against philosophers 
and to re-discover -  against the mainstream tradition -  the 
meaning and value of particular words and expressions or, as 
Rorty puts it in his book on "contingency", "the sense of phonemes 
and graphemes". In the text entitled "Heidegger, Contingency, and
”  It is interesting to pay attention to such penetrating Milan Kundera’s words,
replacing on one’s own the "novelist" with the "philosopher" and the "novel" -  
with "philosophy"... Kundera: "The novel does not state anything -  it searches 
and asks questions... I invent stories, juxtapose them and thereby ask questions. 
Human stupidity derives from the fact that people have answers to all questions... 
The novelist teaches the reader to understand the world as a question. There is 
wisdom and tolerance in that attitude. In the world built of the most sacred 
certainties, the novel is dead. The totalitarian world -  no matter whether based 
on Marx, Islam or anything else, is the world of questions rather than answers. 
There is no place for the novel there. Or at least it seems to me that today in the 
whole world people prefer to pronounce judgements rather than to understand, 
to answer rather than to ask questions -  so the voice of the novel is hardly audible 
among the noisy stupidity of human certainties". Kundera. The Seminar, London: 
Polonia Book Fund, 1988, p. 149.
12 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation” in PP 1, p. 212.
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Pragmatism", Rorty remarks that ever since philosophy won its 
quarrel with poetry, "it has been the thought that counts -  the 
proposition, something which many sentences in many languages 
express equally well".13 According to the traditional account of 
philosophy, it did not really matter whether a given sentence has 
been spoken or written, whether it contained Greek, German or 
English words. Since these words were only vehicles of something 
less fragile and transitory than “marks and noises". Philosophers 
thought that what mattered was only the literal truth, and not the 
choice of phonemes, and certainly not the choice of metaphors. 
For the literal lasts, the metaphorical -  passes without leaving a 
single trace, it is just "impotent", as Rorty says. It is only Heidegger 
who discovers that the intellectual development of Europe can be 
summarized in certain words that we, people of the West, have 
used over the centuries, and among them there have been such 
as, for instance: aletheia, apeiron, logos, arche, idea, telos, or, 
closer to us -  res cogitans, the practical reason, the absolute 
knowledge, will etc. Heidegger in Rorty’s account provides them 
with too great power and is too much convinced that their use -  
like the use of a given metaphor by a poet -  must have doomed 
the course of the thought of the West.
Rorty thus contrasts and develops the opposition between a 
theoretician (called "an ascetic priest", following Nietzsche), who 
loves simplicity, structure, abstraction and, first and foremost -  
essence, and a novelist, who deals with a narrative, detail, 
diversity, multiplicity or accident. He quotes a crucial passage from 
the aforementioned Kundera’s book, the passage which also to us 
seems worth to be noted as a point of departure and inspiration 
of many of Rorty’s ideas. Kundera says the following:
The novel’s wisdom is different from that of philosophy.
The novel is born not of the theoretical spirit but of the 
spirit of humor. One of Europe’s major failures is that it 
never understood the most European of the arts -  the 
novel: neither its spirit, nor its great knowledge and 
discoveries, nor the autonomy of its history. ... Like
13 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 34.
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Penelope, it undoes each night the tapestry that the 
theologians, philosophers and learned men have woven 
the day before.... I do not feel qualified to debate those 
who blame Voltaire for the gulag. But I do feel qualified 
to say: The Eighteenth century is not only the century of 
Rousseau, of Voltaire, of Holbach; it is also (perhaps 
above all!) the age of Fielding, Sterne, Goethe, Laclos.14 15
Thus -  both for Kundera and for Rorty as well (not to mention 
Jacques Derrida from Acts of Literature' 5) -  it is just the novel that 
is a genre characteristic of democracy, the genre most closely 
associated with the struggle for freedom and equality (we are 
developing that idea in far more detail in a separate chapter). In 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Rorty adds that also journalists’ 
reports, comic books, etnographer’s accounts, documentaries 
may serve a similar purpose -  they may, to be more exact, make 
us sensitive to the suffering of others, make us see something that 
otherwise might escape our attention, see still another "source of 
cruelty", often present within ourselves.
The traditional philosophy is largely criticized in Rorty’s account 
for its essentialism, for the continuing search for (non existing, 
anyway) essence, nature, be it the "essence of human self", for 
the desire to reach the "human nature" or the "nature of
14 Milan Kundera quoted in Rorty, PP 2, p. 73. Let us note that the 
metaphorical picture of Penelope undoing her tapestry every night coincides with 
Rorty’s conception of the "contingency of selfhood" from CIS or with J. Hillis 
Miller’s account of the relation between the critic and the text. The differences in 
critical doing and undoing the tapestry are clear -  how different is Derrida from 
CIS, Derrida from Rorty’s "Derrida on Language, Being and Abnormal 
Philosophy" (The Journal of Phil., Nov.1977, pp. 673-681), not to mention e.g. 
Derrida of Christopher Norris (from his Derrida) or of Paul de Man (from The 
Rhetoric of Blindness, pp. 102-141).
15 See Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, New York: 
Routledge, 1992, especially "This Strange Institution Called Literature. An 
Interview with Jacques Derrida”, where he says the following: "The institution of 
literature in the West, in its relatively modern form, is linked to an authorization 
to say everything, and doubtless too to the coming about of the modern idea of 
democracy. Not that it depends on a democracy in place, but it seems 
inseparable from what calls forth a democracy, in the most open (and doubtless 
itself to come) sense of democracy" (p. 37).
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democracy" or the "essence of justice". Or -  as it was the case 
with Heidegger - for the search of the "essence of the West", of 
what is "paradigm atically" Western, which he found in 
Seinsvergessenheit, forgetfulness of Being. Heidegger, as well as 
Plato, are described by Rorty with the Nietzschean term of "ascetic 
priests": he says that "the Heideggerian counterpart of Plato’s 
world of appearances seen from above is the West seen from 
beyond metaphysics".16 Plato looks down, Heidegger looks back, 
but they both are hoping to distance themselves from what they 
are looking at.
According to Rorty, the essentialistic approach to human 
affairs, the philosopher’s attempt to replace adventure, narrative 
and chance with contemplation, dialectic and destiny, is a 
hypocritical way of saying: what matters to me is more important,
I am allowed not to take care of what is important to you because 
it is me and not you who are in touch with something (reality) that 
is beyond your reach. The answer of the novelist to the above 
would be the following:
[l]t is comical to believe that one human being is more in 
touch with something nonhuman than another human 
being. ... It is comical to think that anyone could 
transcend the quest for happiness, to think that any 
theory could be more than a means to happiness, that 
there is something called Truth which transcends 
pleasure and pain.... What is comic about us is that we 
are making ourselves unable to see things which 
everybody else can see -  things like increased or 
decreased suffering -  by convicting ourselves that these 
things are "mere appearances".17
What we seem to need in the postmodern world of the end of 
the twentieth century instead of the appearance/reality distinction 
(but also instead of those of essence/existence, rational/irrational, 
objective/subjective, let us add here) is a multitude of points of
16 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 70.
17 Ibidem, p. 74.
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view, a diversity of descriptions of the same events. And this is 
what the novelist does, not the theoretician. The world of one Truth 
and the relative ambiguous world of the novel are molded of 
entirely different substances, Kundera says. Theorizing based on 
the ideas of One Single Truth and One Proper Description of things 
omits -  due to its essentialization -  the "details of pain" and 
"sources of cruelty" so important and so stressed in Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity, which in turn are essential links within the 
domain of literature (as can be seen, for instance, from Orwell).
The opposition of philosophy in the traditional view and of 
literature, as well as the assimilation of literature by French "new 
philosophizing", blurring of borders existing so far between art and 
philosophy -  these are perhaps the fundamental features of 
postmodernity, although the point is not to melt these spheres but 
to deconstruct them from the inside. The philosopher becomes the 
"cultural critic", as does the former "literary critic" who criticizes still 
wider areas of culture. The opposition of theory and narrative, or 
of metanarrative, metadescription and micronarrative, micrology 
(“in solidarity with metaphysics at the moment of its collapse", as 
Adorno says in his Negative Dialectic), are the "foundations", to 
use the fatal word -  connected with the traditional philosophical 
metaphorics -  in this context, of postmodernity. Rorty, among 
other things, says the following about tasks of the philosopher (and 
once again, we shall return to that crucial quotation more than once 
throughout the course of our study):
The pragmatist philosopher has a story to tell about his 
favorite, and least favored, books -  the texts of, for 
example, Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey 
and Russell. He would like other people to have stories 
to tell about other sequences of texts, other genres -  
stories which fit together with his.18
Such a call -  even within the sphere of its rhetoric -  reminds 
the proposals an suggestions put forward by Lyotard to "essay", 
to "create micronarratives", to "tell stories". Lyotard, for instance,
18 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 82 -  emphasis mine.
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in his Lessons in Paganism, says that what he is doing is "merely 
telling a story, developing my own little narrative". He suggests 
that we should not ask whether a given story is more or less true 
than any other, but should rather notice that "it exists", that it is "a 
product of an almost invincible power to tell stories that we all share 
to a greater or lesser extent".19 Like Kundera elevates the diversity 
of descriptions of the same events (and we can consider e.g. A 
Farewell Waltz in this light, not to be restricted to theory only) and 
Rorty praises the multitude of different descriptions, Lyotard would 
like to tell "different stories about the same historical and political 
points" whenever he wishes to.20 To sum up this passage: let us 
say the same things in some other way and we shall learn 
something new, extend the range of our possibilities and the scope 
of our world, we shall face the unknown (and is not it one of the 
aims of the aesthetics of the sublime?). Let us not believe in single 
descriptions bearing in mind that facts or events come to us only 
through other narratives, remembering that they have already 
been fixed in some context -  and that our narratives use them only 
as their reference.
We could ask here the following question: does the figure of the 
"ironist" -  a well-shaped result of Rorty’s considerations from the 
book on "contingency" -  follow the above advice? He seems so, 
for, as we remember, the ironist’s moral adviser is no one else but 
just the literary critic, with such a justification that he is the sort of 
person who "has been here and there", who has visited the country 
of literary descriptions of the world and thus he will not easily get 
trapped in a single, unified and common description of it made in 
a single vocabulary. So this is what is at stake here -  he is a person 
who has read a lot, met many real and fictitious people and who 
is aware of various possible viewpoints. The ironist loves books 
because they help him in his self-creation, enlarge his own 
description of the world, thus he takes care of them, "locates them 
as friends", "places new ones within the context of old ones" etc.
19 Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons in Paganism in: The Lyotard Reader, 
op.cit., p. 125.
20 Ibidem, p. 125.
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e tc21 He obviously does not appreciate the philosophy of 
theoreticians, preferring probably philosophizing in the manner of 
Lyotardian "essaying" or "saying the unspeakable", philosophizing 
in the manner of Derridean writing about philosophers, about 
prominent figures taken from the history of philosophy...
We could also ask what is Rortyan "pragmatism without 
method". American pragmatism in recent hundred years or so, 
"has swung back and forth between an attempt to raise the rest of 
culture to the epistemological level of the natural sciences and an 
attempt to level down the natural sciences to an epistemological 
par with art, religion, and politics". Thus pragmatism in Rorty’s view 
was a very muddled movement -  "neither hard enough for the 
positivists nor soft enough for the aesthetes, ... a philosophy for 
trimmers". As far as the title lack of method goes, Rorty makes the 
following point:
But this accusation [of intellectual schizophrenia -  MK] 
presupposes that one ought to formulate general 
methodological principles, that one has a duty to have a 
general view about the nature of rational enquiry and a 
universal method for fixing belief. It is not clear that we 
have any such duty. We do have a duty to talk to each 
other, to converse about our views of the world, to use 
persuasion rather than force, to be tolerant of diversity, 
to be contritely fallibilist. But this is not the same as a duty 
to have methodological principles. It may be helpful - it 
sometimes has been helpful -  to formulate such 
principles. It is often, however -  as in the cases of 
Descartes’s Discourse and Mill’s "inductive methods" -  
a waste of time.22
21 Let us say that it brings to mind Kundera’s belief put in Theresa’s mouth 
in The Unbearable Lightness of Being that the book “is a recognition signal of a 
secret brotherhood”, for "against the world of brutality, she had just one sort of 
defence: books...".
22 Richard Rorty, PP 1, pp. 63, 63, 67.
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Thus, as far as a "scientific method" is concerned, Rorty sees 
just one figure of which it can surely be said that it had never used 
it -  it is Martin Heidegger, who merely "points and hints". That 
means, however, that "we cannot criticize him for employing 
another method than the method of science. Heidegger does not 
employ any method. He is not, in any sense, competing with 
science“ 23 24Rorty does not want to see the philosopher as the 
intellectual with special rights, with a free access to always hidden 
Truth. While in European philosophy of the first half of the twentieth 
century there dominated the belief that what counted was being 
"scientific" in the sense of applying a certain (dialectical, inductive, 
analytic or any other) procedure, currently, towards the end of this 
century, intellectual life
would not make much of the line between "philosophy" 
and something else, not try to allot distinctive cultural 
roles to art, religion, science, and philosophy. It would 
get rid of the idea that there was a special sort of expert 
-  the philosopher -  who dealt with a certain range of 
topics (e.g. Being, reasoning, language, knowledge, 
mind). It would no longer think that "philosophy" was the 
name of a sacred precinct that must be kept out of the
04
hands of the enemy.
The response to a liberal challenge would in Rorty’s view be 
the approaching of pragmatism (without "method") and European 
philosophy (without the Heideggerian "depth"). Let us note that the 
architecture of Philosophical Papers suits that purpose fine, and it 
is not accidentally that Rorty speaks of locating post-Nietzschean 
European philosophy in the context of pragmatism as his own role. 
He does not see his task, however, in marrying the two traditions 
which are strange to each other: Continental and analytic 
philosophy, he just says that the philosophical profession is divided 
into two institutionalized traditions and that his hunch is that these
23 Ibidem, p. 73.
24 Ibidem, p. 76.
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traditions "will persist side-by-side indefinitely. I cannot see any 
possibility of compromise".
3.
There are several points of departure to try to approach Richard 
Rorty’s philosophy because various traditional distinctions and 
differences, traditional philosophical commandments, are 
intentionally becoming blurred there. For he sees culture as a 
whole, not believing in the existence of some special "scientific" 
way of dealing with the so-called "philosophical" ideas and treating 
culture, from physics to poetry, as a "continuous, seamless activity 
in which the divisions are merely institutional and pedagogical".25 26
That is why, in his view, philosophers are both "argumentative 
problem solvers" like Aristotle and Russell and oracular 
"world-disclosers" like Plato and Hegel27 28, including Heidegger as 
well as Derrida among the latters. Derrida, this "merely oracular" 
(Habermas) philosopher, has been an object of unfading 
fascination -  and examination -  of Rorty’s discourse, especially if 
we take into account that fact that for Rorty Derrida’s philosophy 
until Of Grammatology had been a "false start" and The Postcard 
is in his view the ultimate fulfillment of Derrida’s philosophical 
desires.
Let us start our discussion with the quotation which is of 
fundamental importance. Rorty says the following:
The quarrel whether Derrida has arguments thus gets 
linked to a quarrel about whether he is a private writer -  
writing for the delight of us insiders who share his 
background, who find the same rather esoteric things as 
funny or beautiful or moving as he does -  or rather a 
writer with a public mission, someone who gives us 
weapons with which to subvert "institutional knowledge"
PRand thus social institutions.
25 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 23.
26 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 76.
27 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 123; the distinction comes from Jürgen Habermas’ 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
28 Ibidem, p. 120 -  emphasis mine.
52 Philosophy of recontextuatization.
A slightly veiled question about the status and the role of the 
contemporary philosopher in today’s world where no longer any 
important role is played by narratives of emancipation (which were 
essential part of the project of modernity) is put forward here; 
narratives whose author was -  let us add for the clarity of our 
p resenta tion -  just the philosopher, the "producer of 
metanarratives" as Lyotard called them. With the beginning of the 
period of the "incredulity towards metanarratives", the intellectual’s 
role as the one whose vocation, moral duty and ethical obligation 
was to "save the world", to create broad, emancipatory social 
visions, seems to be decreasing considerably. The figure of the 
"committed" intellectual who finds his moral identity in preparing 
or promoting a "total revolution", is falling into pieces at the moment 
(let us add that a typical figure of such "activism" was Sartre and 
his intellectual itinerary is very characteristic of a large proportion 
of the twentieth century philosophers and intellectuals).
If Richard Rorty considers today the issue to which extent 
Derrida is a "private writer", and to which a "writer with a public 
mission", he does so not without a good reason. For around the 
problematic of deconstruction and around Derrida himself -  as it 
seems -  there is a clash between two distinct models of 
philosophizing and two models of philosopher; what is at stake 
here is the problem of the private/public distinction, so stressed by 
Rorty (at stake is also the fame in manuals of post-Philosophy, of 
which we writing separately as a Rorty-Derrida struggle going on 
for a couple of years). The above distinction, already mentioned 
in many texts from the second volume of Philosophical Papers, 
finds its full expression, development and application in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity where Rorty -  devoting one of 
the most exciting chapters to Derrida in general, and to his 
Postcard in particular -  sees him as a fully private philosopher, as 
opposed to such public ones as Dewey, Rawls or Habermas. 
Drawing the distinction within the domain of human behavior 
between actions of self-creation and solidarity, and thus between 
private and public actions (with respect to their purpose), Rorty 
can see the incommensurability of both types of behavior, the 
incommensurability of discourses arising around them and, finally 
-  the impossibility of agreeing them into a single discourse on the
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level of theory. Some solution to this Issue is provided by the article 
devoted to Foucault’s moral Identity and private autonomy ("Moral 
Identity and Private Autonomy: the Case of Foucault").29
The point of the text is that the only charge that could be put 
forward in his case would concern not his relativism but rather the 
lack of separation of the two roles played by him (thus, perhaps, 
the lack of a clear mark in which game one is taking part at a given 
moment: a private or a public "language game"): for on the one 
hand, Foucault is a citizen of a democratic country, with a definite 
moral identity, while on the other, he is still searching for an 
autonomy being, as Rorty describes him, a "knight" of it. And these 
two roles -  the one strictly private and the other absolutely public, 
cannot be agreed with each other at a single moment.
The charge of purported "relativism" is very often made with 
reference to postmodern thinkers.30 Let us present here shortly 
only two, exemplary, Rorty’s attempts to dismiss the charge; the 
former comes form the aforementioned text devoted to Foucault, 
the latter is taken from the article about "postmodern bourgeois 
liberalism". Contrary to Habermas from The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, Rorty does not think that Foucault needs 
to answer the charge of "relativism" because, as he says, "if one 
is willing, as Dewey and Foucault were, to give up the hope of 
universalism, then one can give up the fear of relativism as well".31 
If we returned once again to the already mentioned classical Greek 
opposition between philosophers and poets, it could be said that 
philosophers, generally, should be "rational" and their "rationality"
29 See PP 2, pp. 193-198.
30 Let us note that instead of harsh attacks on the ethics of postmodern 
thinkers (in the manner of Jacques Bouveresse from Rationalité et cynisme or 
Manfred Frank from What Is Neostructuralism?), one can also speak of a certain 
-  as Zygmunt Bauman says -  "ethical paradox of postmodemity". The paradox 
in question, in rough terms, is that postmodemity gives man once again the full 
possibility of making moral choice as well as full responsibility for his choice, 
taking away from him, at the same time, previously guaranteed self-confidence. 
“Moral responsibility comes together with the loneliness of moral choice". 
Morality has been privatized -  ethics has become "a matter of individual 
discretion, risk-taking, chronic uncertainty and never-placated qualms". See 
Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, Routledge, 1992; Introduction 
pp. XXII-XXIII.
31 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 198.
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would consist in their ability to show the "universal validity" of their 
standpoint. Poets are not expected to do the same. "Foucault, like 
Nietzsche, was a philosopher who claimed a poet’s privileges. One 
of these privileges is to rejoin ’What has universal validity to do 
with me?’ I think that philosophers are as entitled to this privilege 
as poets, so I think this rejoinder sufficient".32 In a short, and 
perhaps once even programmatic to an extent, text entitled 
"Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism", Rorty accepts another way 
of relieving postmodernism from a morally hard to bear burden of 
"relativism"; the view that each tradition is equally rational or 
equally moral to any other could be held, he remarks, "only by a 
god" who would only mention the terms "rational" and "moral" (and 
not use them). Man, however, cannot play the role of a god and 
escape from history and conversation to contemplation and 
metanarratives. Rorty -  referring to Lyotardian intuitions -  thinks 
that to accuse postmodern thought of relativism is to put a 
metanarrative in its mouth. "One will do this -  he explains -  if one 
identifies ’holding a philosophical position’ with having a 
metanarrative available. If we insist on such a definition of 
’philosophy’, then postmodernism is postphilosophical. But it 
would be better to change the definition".33
There appears here in this context another interesting issue 
which we would not like to omit, namely Rorty’s ambivalent attitude 
towards the very terms "postmodernism" and "postmodern". While 
in Philosophical Papers the two terms do occur -  mainly as objects 
of attacks due to their vagueness, in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity these words do not appear any more. It turns out that 
the terms of "liberalism" and "pragmatism" properly semantically 
modified allow Rorty to locate himself on the intellectual map of 
the present. Generally speaking, Rorty sees "postmodernism" as 
"distrust of metanarratives" 34 But already in the "Introduction" to 
the second volume of Philosophical Papers, he admits an
32 Ibidem, p. 198.
33 Richard Rorty, pp 1, p. 202. About postmodernism or, to be more precise, 
about his own neopragmatism as a "post-Philosophical philosophy" in a 
"post-Philosophical culture" Rorty wrote already in CP, Introduction, p. xxxvii ff. 
or p. 143. Apart from post-Philosophical nature of postmodern thought, one could 
also speak of its metaphilosophical nature.
34 See Richard Rorty e.g. in PP 1, p. 198, PP 2, p. 1.
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unnecessary use of this fatal word (as Wolfgang Welsch says, ein 
Reizwort) in his text. As he puts it: "I have sometimes used 
’postmodern’ myself, in the rather narrow sense defined by Lyotard 
as ’distrust of metanarratives’. But I wish that I had not. The term 
has been so over-used that it is causing more trouble than it is 
worth".35 Rorty goes on to explain that he has given up the attempt 
to find something common to Graves’ buildings, Pynchon’s and 
Rushdie’s novels, Ashberry’s poems or writings of Derrida. He 
shows his (justifiable, after all) hesitation about issues of 
periodizing of culture -  about "describing every part of culture as 
suddenly swerving off in the same direction at approximately the 
same time"36 -  and comes to the conclusion that it would be safer 
and more useful (how pragmatic!) to periodize and dramatize each 
discipline or genre separately, rather than see them holistically. It 
seems worth to be noted that Lyotard clearly distinguished 
between two senses of "postmodernism" in his writings -  the first 
included his normative, strictly described and philosophical 
project, and the second was to be used outside of any directly 
philosophical inspiration and was to refer to architecture (as by 
Charles Jencks, for example), painting (as by Oliva in his famous 
discussions of the "transavant-garde") or to literature.37 Rorty, 
abandoning the use of the term "postmodernism", seems to resign 
himself to some semantic inflation, aware of which are other 
postmodern thinkers, in this particular case, Lyotard.
There is quite a similar confusion surrounding the meaning of 
"deconstruction" which Rorty considers in his text devoted to an 
apparently transcendental character of the Derridean project (as 
such his admirers as Rodolphe Gasche, Christopher Norris or 
Jonathan Culler would like to read it). Thus, in Rorty’s opinion, the 
distinction between two meanings of "deconstruction” could and 
should be drawn: one is Jacques Derrida’s philosophical project, 
and the other is the method of reading texts, absolutely alien to
35 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 1.
36 Ibidem, p. 1.
37 See Jean-François Lyotard, "Answering the Question: What is 
Postmodernism?" (in: The Postmodern Condition, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), pp. 71 -72, or his "Die Moderne redigieren" in Wolfgang 
Welsch’s anthology ( Wege aus der Moderne, Weinheim: Acta Humaniora, 1988), 
p. 213.
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him, as the very idea of "method" is alien to him . If the above 
distinction is beginning to blur, it really might appear that Derrida 
did present "strict" "arguments" in favor of some surprising 
philosophical conclusions, that he has "discovered" some new 
"method" of practising philosophy and of reading literary and 
philosophical texts; that seeking "conditions of possibility" (of a use 
of language), he becomes a transcendental philosopher... Thus, 
it seems, Derrida’s admirers are at loggerheads, Geoffrey 
Hartman and Richard Rorty love him for inventing a new, ironic 
way of writing about philosophical tradition rather than for 
discovering foundations of the so-called "deconstructive literary 
criticism", which they do not particularly appreciate. Derrida as 
presented in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity-as the author of 
The Postcard, that is, idiosyncratic, private fantasies and 
philosophical obsessions put down on paper -  "privatizes his 
philosophical thinking ... drops theory ... in favor of fantasizing 
about predecessors, playing with them, giving free rein to the trains 
of associations they produce"38 9. According to Rorty, the whole of 
Derrida’s significance lies in his courage to give up the attempt to 
unite the private and the public, to unite the search for private 
autonomy and the search for public utility. No sooner does the full 
evaluation of Derrida’s nonpublic philosophizing find its expression 
than in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, although intuitions 
developed later on, as well as Rorty’s very belief in the need to 
defend Derrida’s position, date from the beginning of the eighties, 
as can be testified by texts written then.
In the text entitled "Two Meanings of Logocentrism: A Reply to 
Norris" (published for the first time in 1989), Rorty distinguishes 
three separate audiences to which Derrida speaks. By the first sort 
of audience, he is admired as a philosopher, for he is seen as an 
original follower of the tradition running up from Hegel, Nietzsche, 
and Heidegger. By the second sort of audience, he is seen a a 
writer, and finally, there is the third one (from which Rorty excludes
38 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 85. To see such intentions in Derrida’s readers, it 
is sufficient to read any of the two books by Christopher Norris (Deconstruction: 
Theory and Practice or Derrida) or The Tain of the Mirror by Rodolphe Gasche.
39 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 125.
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himself) which consists of people engaged in "deconstructionist 
literary criticism", assimilating early Derrida to Paul de Man’s 
thought.40 About peculiar relations between literary criticism and 
philosophy, as well as about dangers of such a marriage, Rorty 
writes in "Texts and Lumps". Literary criticism, as he sees it, moves 
back and forth between a desire of tiny, specific tasks and that of 
painting broad visions. Currently it is in the stage of "painting big 
pictures" and hence its great interest taken in philosophy. But
there is a danger that literary critics seeking help from 
philosophy may take philosophy a bit too seriously. They 
will do this if they think of philosophers as supplying 
"theories of meaning" or "theories of the nature of 
interpretation", as if "philosophical research" into such 
topics had recently yielded interesting new "results".41
Similarly, philosophy oscillates between its self-image 
modelled on the Kuhnian "normal science", in which small 
problems are definitely solved one after another and its self-image 
modelled on his "revolutionary science", within which all old 
philosophical problems are rejected as pseudo-problems and 
philosophers begin to redescribe phenomena in a new light. 
Theory of literature used mainly philosophy of the second sort, 
unfortunately, as Rorty says, its attempts to make its descriptions 
are as if it made use of its first sort. So it uses a scientistic rhetoric, 
characteristic of an analytic style of philosophizing. And it is better 
to realize that "philosophy is no more likely to produce ’definitive 
results’ ... than is literary criticism itself".42 As we have already 
mentioned, the pragmatist has a story to tell about his books... So 
it seems to us that it is only "late" (although not today’s, I suppose) 
Derrida that is for Rorty an ideal example necessary to discuss the 
private/public distinction; Michel Foucault was not such a good 
example yet.
40 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 113.
41 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 78 -  emphasis mine.
42 Ibidem, p. 78.
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Closing this chapter, let us say the following: Rorty suggests a 
coherent and optimistic vision (as opposed to pessimistic view of 
"melancholic" Frenchmen) of postmodern reality for which the 
central point of reference is a -  liberal -  elimination of "cruelty" and 
“humiliation"; he wants to be a charitable adviser, without 
producing always dangerous metanarratives. He is aware of the 
collapse of the modern "era of gardeners" (Bauman), with its 
visions of the "perfect society", "new man", or "new society". He is 
aware of the disappearance of the epoch of the Single True 
Description and accepts existential uncertainty, the contingency 
of being, the lack of not only arche, but of telos as well. For he is 
afraid of creating a "paradise on the earth" in the way prophetically 
presented by e.g. Dostoyevsky in The Devils. From his political 
and philosophical beliefs there comes the picture of historicist and 
nominalist culture where the realization of utopias is an endless 
process, "an endless, proliferating realization of Freedom, rather 
than a convergence toward an already existing Truth".43
43 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. xvi.
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